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bottom two income quintiles.  Finally, a review of the literature across the OECD suggests that the
progressivity of financing of the health insurance system has limited implications for overall income
inequality, particularly over time.
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sag1@columbia.eduThe most appropriate generalization of the financing of developed county health 
care systems is that they share no general characteristic.  Few systems fall squarely into 
any single box and even systems that more-or-less do, have evolved in their financing 
over time.  In 1960, the cost of health care in the OECD countries consumed just under 
4% of their collective GDP.  By 2000, it consumed twice as high a share of the GDP.   
This escalation in spending is nowhere accommodated without debate or modification.   
Most countries intend that their health care system -- and its several components –
be financed in a manner that is both efficient and progressive.  An efficient system 
minimizes the deadweight losses associated with raising and disbursing revenue.  A 
progressive system redistributes resources from the rich toward the poor.  This paper 
examines how alternative financing systems perform with respect to these two goals.  
This paper will focus on choices among general revenue, social insurance, private 
insurance, and private out-of-pocket financing in all or portions of a health care system.  
These choices have efficiency and equity implications both in the collection and the 
disbursal of funds.  These implications arise at three levels.  First, financing choices 
affect the efficiency with which the health care system produces and supplies health care 
services.  Second, these choices have redistributive implications within the health sector.  
Finally, the choice of how to collect funds cannot be disentangled from the functioning of 
the social service sector and the economy as a whole.  They have implications for the 
general efficiency and equity of society broadly. 
 
1   1.  Defining Terms 
The principal choices for financing a health care system are general revenues, 
social insurance financing, private insurance financing, and out-of-pocket payments.  
General revenue financing here refers to a system of revenue collection through a broad-
based tax.  All or a portion of this tax may be dedicated to the health care system 
(although this is generally just an accounting convention).  General revenues may be 
raised at the federal, provincial/state, or local levels.  Although often associated with 
progressive financing, general revenues can be raised through tax vehicles that are also 
more or less progressive – from a progressive income tax to a relatively regressive sales 
tax (or a highly regressive sin tax).  General revenues are used to finance a portion of the 
health care system almost everywhere.  In countries that rely primarily on social 
insurance, general revenue funds are often used to cover the costs of nonworkers.  
General revenue financing usually refers to a pay-as-you-go arrangement, where current 
revenues are used to finance current expenditures.   
There is no clear definition of social insurance financing.  I use the term here to 
refer to a system in which some group of people, usually workers, is mandated to make 
contributions to a health care financing (or, for example, retirement) program
1.  Social 
insurance contributions are usually either regressive (a flat per capita mandate) or 
proportional (a flat payroll tax rate).   Social insurance financing based on payroll 
taxation faces the problem that the tax base, which excludes non-labor income, may be 
                                                 
1 According to the United Nations System of National Accounts, 1993, Annex IV, para. 4.111 an insurance 
programme is designated as a social insurance programme if at least one of the following three conditions 
are met: 
· participation in the programme is compulsory either by law or by the conditions of employment; or 
· the programme is operated on behalf of a group and restricted to group members; or 
· an employer makes a contribution to the programme on behalf of an employee. 
2   narrower than under broader scope general revenue financing (Amelung and Glied, 
2003).  Moreover, some social insurance systems cap the maximum contribution, 
reducing the progressivity of this financing mechanism.  Contributions collected through 
the social insurance system should finance the full insured cost of the health program (or 
a pre-specified proportion of that cost).  Thus, the contribution level or rate is tied to the 
cost of providing health insurance.  Social insurance payments may vary with the choice 
of plan in a multi-plan system (as in Germany) or they may be fixed (as in the US 
Medicare program).  Social insurance systems can employ pre-funding, building up “trust 
funds” to account for future expenses, but meaningful trust funds (that cannot be readily 
encroached) are rare.   
Private insurance financing may be individual (although this is rare except in 
highly regulated contexts) or operate through employers or other purchasing 
organizations.  Except in highly regulated contexts or in employer-sponsored groups, the 
price of coverage is related to expected health expenditures – older, sicker people pay 
more for coverage and premiums rise as health expenditures rise.  The concept of 
progressivity does not have a clear analogue in the private pay case.  Under private 
coverage, people choose both how much to purchase and, by extension, how much to pay 
as a share of their income.  Even in a situation without health insurance, however, health 
care utilization rises less than proportionately with income (the income elasticity of 
health care utilization is, at the micro level, less than one).  The premiums paid by lower 
income people are only slightly lower than those charged to higher income people, a 
situation that would be viewed as regressive if the premiums were taxes.  A special (and 
particularly regressive) complication of private financing occurs through the favorable 
3   tax treatment of private employer-sponsored health insurance premiums, which exists in 
many countries including Canada (in all provinces except Quebec), the United States, the 
UK, Denmark, France, and Australia.  Here, a tax subsidy is regressively distributed in 
the context of otherwise privately financed health insurance.  Finally, virtually all 
observed private health insurance contracts are of short duration – almost always only 
one year.  This makes it difficult to pre-fund care, except through savings mechanisms 
outside the health system. 
Out-of-pocket payments are those payments into the health care system that are 
made directly at the point of service.  In this category, I include full payments (as in the 
case of pharmaceuticals or nursing home care for those without insurance coverage) as 
well as copayments and deductibles.  A system with only out-of-pocket payment would 
(in a tax sense) finance health care regressively, since health service use rises less than 
proportionately with income.   
Note that the revenue-raising and benefit-disbursing components of these systems 
work differently over the lifecycle than they do at a point in time.  At a point in time, 
income taxes tend to be more progressive than social insurance taxes which, in turn, are 
generally more progressive than consumption and VAT taxes.  When costs and benefits 
are computed over the lifecycle, however, relative progressivity can change because 
higher income people generally live longer than do those with lower incomes.  
Consumption taxes are paid throughout life and reflect consumption (which generally 
exceeds income among older people).  This means that survivors (who have higher 
lifetime incomes, on average) will pay more in lifetime consumption taxes than decedents 
(who have lower lifetime incomes), making this tax more progressive.  Conversely, 
4   income and particularly social insurance taxes appear less progressive in the lifecycle 
context.  Younger people pay relatively higher taxes, but those with lower incomes may 
disproportionately fail to survive and collect benefits at older ages. 
Figure 1 illustrates the composition of health care financing across the OECD 
countries.  In most countries, insurance covers about 80% of health care costs, with out-
of-pocket spending accounting for the remainder.  The structure of out-of-pocket 
spending, however, varies substantially among countries.  In the United States, which 
lacks universal insurance coverage for those under 65, a small number of individuals 
account for a large share of out-of-pocket costs.  In some countries, certain services are 
excluded from public insurance coverage and out-of-pocket spending accounts for a large 
share of costs for these particular services.  In other countries, a broader range of services 
is included in the health insurance package, but substantial copayments are required for 
all services.   
Private insurance accounts for a substantial share of health care costs only in the 
United States, and even in the United States, private insurance accounts for only about 
1/3 of health spending.  Outside the United States, the private insurance share varies 
between 0 and 16% (Canada ranks 4
th at 11.5%).  In some countries, private insurance 
plays a large role in the health care market, even though it finances only a small 
proportion of care.  Indeed, the prevalence of private insurance (that is, the proportion of 
the population covered by some private insurance) is greater in France, Switzerland, and 
the Netherlands than in the United States (SourceOECD, 2006). 
Countries differ markedly in their use of general revenues and social insurance 
funds to finance the public share of expenditures.  In the English-speaking countries, as 
5   well as in Italy, Sweden, and Denmark, general revenues finance virtually all public 
health expenditures.  At the other extreme, in France and the Netherlands, general 
revenues play an insignificant role and social insurance pays the bulk of health 
expenditures. 
Various combinations of general revenue and social insurance sources present 
different efficiency and equity tradeoffs.  An assessment of the overall efficiency and 
progressivity of tax system usually requires complex modeling.  Kessleman and Cheung 
summarize evidence on the progressivity of the Canadian tax system (2004).  
Unfortunately, the studies they studies are somewhat dated and do not reflect recent 
changes in tax structure.  Overall, Kesselman and Cheung find that in Canada, those in 
the lowest income quintile pay an average tax rate of about 17% (mainly through 
consumption, corporate, and payroll taxes), while those the highest income quintile pays 
an average tax rate of about 43%, with personal income taxes accounting for the bulk of 
these taxes.  Kesselman and Cheung also report average tax rates by age group and 
family status.  Younger adults and single people pay much higher average taxes than do 
single parents, single earner families, or older people.  Thus, the Canadian tax system is 
fairly progressive, but progressivity differs across groups. 
Financing systems also differ in the efficiency with which they raise funds.  In 
general, financing systems are more efficient the less they distort individuals’ choices 
(around work, consumption, investment, etc.).  In this sense, private insurance (without a 
tax subsidy) and out-of-pocket payments are fully efficient.  Tax-based financing systems 
are less efficient, but their relative efficiency depends on the entire structure of the tax 
system.  For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on how financing affects efficiency in 
6   the operation of the health care system, rather than on the efficiency of the financing 
system itself. 
 
2.  Financing Choices and the Efficiency of the Operation of the Health Care 
System 
A health system operates in an economically efficient manner if health care 
resources cannot be reorganized in a way that would make all members of society better 
off.  Technical efficiency occurs when health care system inputs are used optimally to 
address a particular health care need.  As technical efficiency depends on the systems 
used to pay providers, any of the insurance financing systems is compatible with a range 
of provider payment mechanisms.  For example, a general revenue financed system could 
pay providers using salaries (as in the UK), fee-for-service rates (as in Canada), case rates 
(DRGs) or capitated rates (as for primary care purchasers in the UK).    
In market competition, the invisible hand of the market determines optimal 
payment rates for goods and services providers.   There are many reasons that this happy 
outcome may not occur in the health care system and the market may bid prices up too 
high.  Provider monopoly power or other related payment inefficiencies, however, do not 
affect the choice of financing system.  Payment rates may also, in theory, be established 
independent of the form of financing, although this may be practically difficult to 
achieve.  For example, by using regulation, systems with decentralized revenue collection 
can achieve the same monopsony payment rates that centralized payment systems can, as 
was the case in the all payer rate setting systems that set uniform payment rates for all 
payers and all hospitals in several US states during the 1980s and early 1990s..  
7   Moreover, large private purchasers (as exist in the US, Germany, and the Netherlands) 
may have enough market power to exert appropriate countervailing pressure in the 
provider marketplace. 
System efficiency begins to tie in to financing when consumer choices enter the 
health care system.  The first place this occurs is in the decision to use care.  The RAND 
health insurance experiment results (and common sense) suggest that systems with 
copayments or coinsurance will tend to reduce the use of services.  As countless 
commentators have argued, there is no particular reason to believe that the decisions of 
uninformed consumers/patients to reduce their service utilization will be medically 
appropriate.  There are, however, situations where requiring the consumer to face some 
cost consequences of specific decisions would improve the efficiency of the system.   For 
example, consumers might be asked to make choices between initiating treatment with a 
less costly drug or initiating treatment with a more costly alternative.  Requiring out-of-
pocket payments in this context is compatible with any of the insurance financing 
arrangements.  It may improve the efficiency of the system.  The effects on equity depend 
on protections that are put in place for lower income people. 
A connection between efficiency and financing may also arise in the context of 
system fragmentation.  The difficulty of defining and measuring health care services, the 
complexity of services that need to be organized, and the problem of hand-offs among 
services suggest that more aggregated forms of payment – including payment to health 
plans or provider groups –may be preferable to provider-specific payment arrangements.  
Organizing care into multiple health plans (including plans with integrated delivery) paid 
risk-adjusted capitated rates may (in principle) improve the efficiency of care.  Once a 
8   system is divided into multiple distinct delivery systems, however, consumers/patients 
must either be compelled or be provided with incentives to make an appropriate selection 
and stick with it.   
Consumers can be induced to choose efficient plans by allowing (risk-adjusted) 
premiums to vary among plans and requiring consumers to pay more for more costly plan 
choices (as in the Netherlands and Germany).  Even in this case, however, any source of 
financing can be used to make the basic plan payment, and additional payments would be 
out-of-pocket.  Moreover, efficient choice of plans can also be accomplished by paying 
plans risk-adjusted equivalent rates per capita, and then permitting plans to compete only 
on the scope of services included in the plan.   
The options above suggest that achieving the goal of efficiency within the health 
care sector is fundamentally compatible with any form of general financing.  Another 
element of efficiency, however, is choosing the appropriate size of the health care sector 
relative to spending on other goods and services.  In pure general revenue systems, this 
can only be accomplished globally, through the political process.  Within that process, 
providers and disease interest groups are likely to exert substantial political pressure to 
maintain or expand the size of the system.   Moreover, since health care spending 
constitutes only one of many government services, it may be difficult for ordinary 
citizens to assess the efficiency of the system.  The lack of transparency and political 
accountability of general revenue financed systems has led some analysts to prefer social 
insurance financing.   
9   Under social insurance financing, the cost of health care is more transparent 
obvious to taxpayers, in the form of a tax rate or mandated premium payment
2.  
Moreover, social insurance financed systems increasingly organize their systems into 
capitated health plans (paid risk-adjusted rates) so that consumers can adjust their 
consumption of health care and other goods at the margin.  The basic social insurance 
payment to health plans can be set at a government-mandated minimum level and 
consumers who wish to consume more health care may choose more generous plans, 
paying out-of-pocket for the incremental valuation.   
Private insurance systems can also have transparent payment levels and permit 
consumers to choose more or less expensive health plans.  In practice, the existence of 
employer-sponsored insurance, the preferential tax treatment of premiums, and the 
existence of substantial risk selection between plans may make it more difficult for 
private insurance systems to achieve efficiency in the delivery of services.   
In sum, almost all financing choices are compatible with efficiency in the delivery 
of health care.  Arrangements with transparent costs, such as social insurance models, 
may reduce the ability of providers to exploit their concentration within the system.  
Arrangements that require consumers to pay for more costly than average choices may, at 
the margin, improve the efficiency of the mix between health care spending and other 
sectors.   
Empirical assessment of the effects of financing arrangements on health care 
spending is necessarily constrained by the limited number of similar countries available 
for study.  The OECD routinely collects data on the costs and financing of health care 
                                                 
2 Note that the transparency of the system may be obscured to the extent that the health care tax or premium 
payment for an individual also captures a redistributive component.    
10   systems (SourceOECD).  Consistent data are available for about 20 health care systems in 
the 1990s, and somewhat fewer in the 1980s and 1970s.   There is considerable 
persistence in the per capita cost of health care across countries over time (see Figure 2), 
even as financing arrangements change.  Thus, rather than examining the effect of 
financing on health care spending at a point in time, I use this extended time series to 
assess the relationship between financing arrangements and the rate of growth of health 
care spending over time during each 5-year period.  I estimate (separately for each of 
1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000) simple equations of the form: 
Total expendituret = α+ βgeneral revenue sharet-5 + χsocial insurance share t-5 + δout-of-
pocket share t-5 + φtotal expenditure t-5 + ε 
 
I also estimated specifications that included controls for changes in the 
demographic composition of the population (aging) and repeated the analysis using 
financing composition at the end rather than the beginning of the period.  These 
modifications did not substantively affect the results.  Results of the main analysis are 
reported in Table 1.  I report results including and excluding the United States.   
The main finding of Table 1 is that there is no persistent and regular relationship 
between the structure of system financing and the rate of growth in per capita health 
expenditures in a health system.  The results including the United States suggest that 
during the 1990-1995 period, countries that began the period with a greater proportion of 
health care expenditures funded from general revenues, social insurance, or out-of-pocket 
experienced less cost escalation did those with more private payment.   Conversely, over 
the 1970-1980 period, countries with more private payment experienced less cost 
escalation.  When the United States is excluded from the analysis, countries with more 
11   general revenue financing or more out-of-pocket financing (but not those with more 
social insurance financing) experienced less cost growth than did those with more private 
insurance financing over the 1990-1995 period and there are no other statistically 
significant results.  I also examined how the composition of public financing affected the 
rate of growth of public expenditures over time.  The results are similarly variable over 
time, suggesting no clear pattern.   
The findings of these analyses are consistent with the theoretical discussion 
above.  While taxes vary in the efficiency and progressivity with which they raise funds, 
the efficiency of operation of the health care system itself appears to depend much more 
on how providers are paid and how the delivery of care is organized than on the method 
used to raise these funds.   
 
3.  Financing Choices and Lifecycle Equity 
In additional to measuring financing choices in terms of their impact on the 
efficiency of operation of the system, it is also important to judge these choices on how 
they contribute to the equity of the system.  The standard metric of progressivity used in 
public finance assesses progressivity as the ratio of taxes paid to income.   This makes 
sense if the funds collected through taxation are used to fund public goods that are 
equally available to all.  In the case of cash or in-kind transfers, however, equity requires 
an assessment of both revenue collection and transfers made.  Equity suggests that there 
should be net benefit transfers to lower income people. For any given level of national 
health spending, the degree of equity in a health care system depends both on how 
12   revenues for the system are raised and how spending in that system is disbursed among 
beneficiaries
3.   
 In assessing the effect of system financing on system equity, I therefore follow 
the public finance literature and examine how the difference between payments made and 
benefits received from a health insurance program for higher income people compares 
with the difference for lower income people.  In the case of a fully private system, this 
calculation is straightforward.  Premiums paid each year reflect expected health care 
benefits for that person in that year.  Premiums each year are, after a non-income related 
adjustment for loading, actuarially equal to benefits received that year.  Lifetime 
premiums paid are actuarially equivalent to lifetime benefits received.  Although the 
system generates ex post redistribution between the healthy and the sick, ex ante the 
system is entirely non-redistributive. 
Social insurance and general revenue financed programs depart from this model 
in two ways.  First, these programs pool all beneficiaries, so payments made in any given 
year reflect the average cost of all beneficiaries covered in that year, not individual 
specific costs.  Second, payments into the system each year are related to current income, 
according to the design of the tax system.  This means that lifetime premiums need not 
reflect lifetime benefits.   
To see the implications of these two features, imagine that income was unrelated 
to either health expenditures or health status.  In a progressive financing system, this 
would imply that in each year, higher income people would pay more into the system 
                                                 
3 Since health care costs have been rising more rapidly than financing, there are substantial 
intergenerational transfers in the health care system.  I will treat these inter-cohort transfers as 
progressivity-neutral.   
13   than they would receive (and vice versa).  The same pattern would hold over people’s 
lifetimes.  The system would be redistributive from high to low income.   
In most universal publicly-financed health care systems, including Canada’s 
however, income is related to both health expenditures at a point in time and to health 
status.  This relationship has three components.  First, at any given age, lower income 
people are usually in worse health than are higher income people.  This leads them to use 
more health care services, generating a progressive distribution of benefits.  Second, 
conditional on need, higher income people and lower income people may use care 
differently, even under universal free access to care.  Van Doorslaer and Masseria (2004) 
find that in about ½ of OECD countries (including Canada), conditional on need, lower 
income people are more likely to use hospital services than are higher income people, and 
in most countries, they spend more days in hospital once hospitalized.  Conversely, in all 
OECD countries, conditional on need, higher income people are more likely to see any 
doctor, to use specialist services, and tend to have more specialist visits, than do lower 
income people (see also Roos and Mustard, 1997)
4.   On average, conditional on health 
status, higher income people use the system more intensively and use more costly health 
services than do lower income people. 
Third, income is closely related to mortality.  In Canada, in 1996, life expectancy 
at birth was about 5 years longer for men in the highest income quintile than for men in 
the lowest income quintile.   Life expectancy for women was about 1.6 years longer in 
the highest than in the lowest income quintiles (Wilkins, Berthelot, and Ng, 2002)
5.   
Lower income people were much less likely to survive to age 75.  While about 69% of 
                                                 
4 These income-related patterns are partially attributable to differences in access to health facilities in 
(higher income) urban and (lower income) rural areas.  
5 I am grateful to Russell Wilkins for sharing the mortality data with me. 
14   higher income men survived to 75, only 53% of lower income men did (see Figure 3).  
Among women, 80% of higher income but only 73% of lower income survived to age 75 
(see Figure 4).  This pattern of differential survival, combined with similar spending at 
each age and increasing spending over the lifecycle, reduces the lifetime spending 
benefits of a public health insurance system for lower income people.   
This combination of factors means that the extent to which benefits under a 
universal health insurance system are distributed in a progressive fashion, and the net 
progressivity of the system, is an empirical question.   
A small literature examines the net progressivity of social welfare systems in 
lifecycle context.  Several studies have examined this question in the context of pension 
systems in the US and Canada (see, for example, Brown 1998, who concludes that both 
the US and Canadian pension systems remain progressive after accounting for longevity) 
and in the context of the U.S. Medicare system, which provides universal health 
insurance to people 65 and over.  Studies of the US Medicare system, a universal, social 
insurance financed health insurance program for people 65+, reach conflicting results on 
progressivity.  In their basic calculations (omitting the utility value of insurance), 
McClellan and Skinner (2005) conclude that Medicare generates modest dollar transfers 
toward higher income people.  Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla (2005), using education, 
rather than income as the measure of socioeconomic status, find that the hospital benefit 
in Medicare is somewhat progressive.   
I examine this question in the Canadian context using data from the Canadian 
Community Health Survey 2000
6 (CCHS), data on mortality rates by income quintile in 
1996 from Statistics Canada, and data on expenditures from SourceOECD.  I compute the 
                                                 
6 Courtney Ward graciously provided these data to me. 
15   average number of general practitioner visits, specialist visits, and hospital days by age 
group and gender and by income quintiles, using household-size adjusted income 
quintiles provided in the CCHS.  I then assign a level of spending (intended to include 
associated ancillary services, diagnostic tests, etc.) to each general practitioner visit 
($75), specialist visit ($375), and hospital day ($1000), so that total spending for 
physician service use and hospital use corresponds (roughly) to the OECD population 
totals for Canada.  I use these data to compute spending levels by quintile throughout the 
life cycle.  Figures 5 and 6 present these spending patterns for men and women. 
As expected, health care spending rises with age for both men and women.  For 
both men and women, there is a pronounced difference in health spending between the 
three upper and two lower quintiles from ages 30 to about 55.  After about age 55, 
spending patterns of the groups begin to converge.  In late life, spending for the upper 
quintiles accelerates much more quickly than among the lower quintiles.   
I next combine these data with the information on survival.  Using these 
combined data, I compute lifetime public health care expenditures in Canada by quintile.  
I calculate these expenditures at age 12, at age 25 (not shown), and at age 65.  These 
results are reported in Table 2.  In each set of results, the first column reports results that 
do not adjust for life expectancy and do not discount later spending.  The second column 
reports results that adjust for life expectancy but do not discount later spending.  The 
third column reports results adjusted for life expectancy and discounted at 5%. 
Undiscounted, unadjusted lifetime health care spending measured at age 12 
ranges from about $85,000 (high income men) to $170,000 (low income women).  
Adjusting for differences in life expectancy reduces lifetime spending.  For high income 
16   men, the effect of adjusting for life expectancy (without discounting) is to reduce 
expected lifetime spending by about 22% for men (slightly more for lower income men) 
and by about 11% for women (slightly more for higher income women).  Discounting 
substantially reduces lifetime spending, particularly measured at earlier ages, because 
most health care costs occur in later life.  Discounted lifetime health care costs are 
between 12% and 65% higher for women than for men in each quintile.   
The three rows below the quintile estimates indicate the ratio of lifetime health 
spending between the highest and lowest quintiles (Q1:Q5), the middle and lowest 
quintile (Q3:Q5), and the highest and middle quintile (Q1:Q3).  The patterns are quite 
different for men and women.  Using the discounted figures, among men, lifetime 
expenditures are about 10% higher for men in the lowest quintile men than for men in the 
middle quintile, while spending is about 50% higher for men in the middle quintile 
compared to those in the highest quintile.  For women, the differences are smaller.  
Spending for women in the middle quintile is about 9% higher than spending in the 
highest quintile, while spending in the lowest quintile is about 40% higher than spending 
in the middle quintile. 
Measuring lifetime expenditures at age 25, rather than age 12, has little effect on 
the patterns (not shown).  Consistent with prior studies in the United States, however, 
lifetime expenditures beginning at age 65 tend to be slightly higher for higher income 
groups than for lower income groups.   
The final column in each of the panels describes the redistributive impact of 
putting $1 of tax funds into the health care system.  The modest relationship between 
lifetime health care spending and income mean that a universal health insurance system 
17   can only be slightly redistributive.  Putting $1 of tax funds into the public health 
insurance system effectively channels between $0.23 and $0.26 toward the lowest income 
people, and about $0.50 to the bottom two income quintiles.  For example, suppose all 
funds for a universal health insurance system were generated from the top three income 
quintiles.  As these quintiles also use health care services, about ½ of the funds raised 
would be returned to them.  The other ½ of the funds raised would be redistributed to the 
bottom two income quintiles.   
The lifecycle and cross-service patterns of health care spending also suggest that 
some forms of health care spending are more progressive than others.  Lower income 
people are disproportionate users of hospital days, perhaps because arranging discharge is 
more complicated for those with fewer resources (Van Doorslaer and Masseria, 2004).  In 
most health care systems, low income people are less likely to initiate specialist care than 
are higher income people, despite their worse initial health status.  In most countries, 
lower income people use more hospital days, conditional on hospitalization, than do 
higher income people.  In Canada, higher income people also make disproportionate use 
of elective surgical procedures, such as hip replacement and knee replacement (Roos and 
Mustard, 1997).  Finally, higher income people make more use of health care services at 
older ages, while lower income people have disproportionately higher use in mid-life. 
These patterns suggest that focusing the marginal public health care dollar on 
skilled nursing days, access to general practitioners, and care associated with conditions 
that manifest in mid-life will have a more progressive effect than focusing additional tax 
dollars on elective surgical procedures or specialist care.  At the margin, progressive 
financing sources should be devoted to progressive ends. 
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4.  Health Care in the Bigger Picture 
The optimal design of health care system financing cannot be assessed in isolation 
from the rest of the components of the economy and the welfare state.  Public funds used 
to finance health care cannot be used for other purposes.  If health care spending rises, 
either taxes must increase or other services must be cut.  This problem is acute in the case 
of health care spending because this sector is growing more rapidly than any other 
element of government budgets.  Moreover, the relatively modest progressive impact of 
spending on health care raises the risk that rising health care spending is displacing more 
progressive cash or in-kind transfer programs.   
A limited number of studies have examined the effect of in-kind transfer 
programs, such as health insurance programs, on the general progressivity of the welfare 
state.  If non-cash benefits are very large relative to incomes, the inclusion of universal, 
uniformly-distributed, non-cash benefits would significantly reduce measured inequality 
in a population.  If non-cash benefits are progressively distributed, their inclusion will 
reduce measured inequality still further.  Smeeding et al. (1993) use data from the early-
1980s to examine the impact of including non-cash benefits in the measurement of 
economic inequality across countries.  In that study, inclusion of non-cash in-kind 
benefits (including public health insurance) had little effect on the relative rankings of 
countries in terms of economic inequality.   
In a recent paper, Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding (2006) revisit this issue.  
Their analysis incorporates the value of in-kind educational and health transfers 
(measured at the average cost across countries), and the distributive impact of the taxes 
19   used to finance these transfers.  Note that Garfinkel, Rainwater and Smeeding conduct 
their analysis at a point in time and do not incorporate the lifecycle considerations 
described above.  They find that the most important redistributive in-kind transfers are 
those that provide education to children.  Inclusion of these benefits substantially alters 
the picture of relative well-being among children across countries.   
Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding isolate the effects of health spending 
transfers by conducting analyses that focus only on the population 65 and over.  In their 
analyses, health spending levels vary by age but not by income level.  Empirically, health 
spending varies relatively little by income at older ages, suggesting that this assumption 
probably does not affect their results very much.   
Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding report results for the population 65 and over 
using average values of health benefits across country
7.  As expected, they find that 
unadjusted income inequality tends to be higher in the English-speaking countries and 
lowest in the Scandinavian countries.  Consistent with Smeeding’s earlier study of the 
1980s, however, the inclusion of the value of in-kind transfers (net of the impact on 
equity of the revenue collection to finance them) has very little effect on measured 
inequality, at least among older people.  Inclusion of these benefits leads the inequality 
ratio for the low income vs. middle income population to fall slightly in most cases (by a 
maximum of 7 points, from 62 to 69 in Belgium) and actually generates a decline in 
equity in a few cases (by a maximum of 8 points, from 58 to 50, in Germany).  The 
                                                 
7 Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding also report results using the actual value of health care benefits in 
each country.  Using the average value of health benefits (as I do here) has the effect of reducing the impact 
of high US health care costs on the extent of inequality reduction achieved through health benefit transfers 
in the US.   
20   effects on inequality between the high and middle income population are slightly greater 
in magnitude, but equally inconsistent in direction.     
These results suggest that public financing of the health care system has 
surprisingly little impact on overall economic equality.  This implies that the value of 
health benefits received, net of taxes paid, by income quintile is small relative to income 
and other components of well-being and, consistent with our findings above, that health 
spending at a point in time does not vary greatly with income.   
The final question of interest is the impact of rising health care expenditures on 
equality.  No studies have examined this question directly.  Instead, I examine the 
evolution of health care spending and tax revenue over time.   
Figure 7 shows how the tax share of GDP and the health care share of GDP have 
evolved across the OECD over time.  The tax shares of most economies have risen 
substantially since 1975, but there is considerable variation among countries in rates of 
growth of taxation.  The health share of GDP has also increased since 1975 in most 
countries, but in most countries, the health share of GDP has increased less than the tax 
share of GDP.  In these countries, increases in taxation have more than accommodated 
rising health care spending.  By contrast, in six countries – Canada, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States – the rise in health 
care spending as a share of GDP has been greater than the rise in tax revenue.  In most of 
these countries, this pattern reflects a relatively slow increase in tax revenue rather than a 
relatively rapid increase in health care costs.   If all health care spending in these 
countries were public, other types of spending would have been displaced by health care 
expenditures.    
21   Figure 8 repeats this analysis using the public health expenditure share of GDP.  
Although the six countries above differ substantially in the share of expenditures that are 
public, the pattern seen in Figure 7 is repeated in Figure 8.  In these countries, tax policy 
has been constrained and has not accommodated increases in publicly-financed health 
care expenditures.  Rather, the effect of constraining taxes has been that publicly-
financed health care expenditures have displaced other forms of government spending.  
Without further information, however, it is not possible to ascertain the relative efficiency 
or equity of this displacement. 
 
5.  Implications for Financing 
The analyses presented in this paper suggest first, that the form of health care 
financing has no systematic relationship to the efficiency with which the health care 
system operates, at least to the extent that efficiency can be proxied by cost
8.  Second, 
over the lifecycle, public expenditures on health care appear to be modestly progressive, 
with the main progressive impact of this spending occurring among middle-aged people.  
In Canada, $1 of tax money spent on health care generates about $0.50 worth of benefits 
to the lower two income quintiles and about $0.50 worth of benefits for the upper three 
income quintiles.  Third, patterns of health service utilization in developed countries 
suggest that the marginal dollar of health care spending – money used to purchase high 
tech equipment or specialist services – is less progressively spent than the average dollar.  
Depending on the form of financing, this marginal dollar may not be distributed 
progressively at all.  Fourth, health care spending has little impact on the general 
                                                 
8 As noted above, alternative sources of revenue themselves have efficiency implications, regardless of how 
the funding is used.  
  
22   distribution of well-being in society.  Distributing progressively-financed public funds 
through universal health insurance programs has limited impact on the distribution of 
total income.  Finally, rising health expenditures threaten to displace other types of 
publicly-financed transfers.  This outcome has already occurred in many relatively low 
tax share economies, including in Canada. 
This pattern of results has two implications for the form of financing of the health 
care system.  In terms of public financing, the results suggest that forms of revenue 
collection that tax both older adults and young people are more equitable, over the 
lifecycle, than those that tax younger people and cover older people.  The greatest 
redistributive benefits of public health financing occur among middle-aged people who 
become seriously ill or disabled.  Differential mortality and relatively equal health status 
among survivors make public financing of benefits to the elderly less redistributive.  
In terms of the mix of public and private financing, the potential for public health 
insurance to crowd out other forms of redistributive benefits, without generating 
significant redistribution themselves, suggests that a mixed financing system may be the 
optimal way to balance efficiency and equity in health care.  At the margin, increasing 
the level of public health expenditures to address ever-improving health care technologies 
will eventually – and, in some instances, may already -- reduce the overall level of equity 
in society by moving scarce tax revenues from cash to less redistributive in-kind 
transfers.  Progressive taxes are most effectively deployed to provide progressive 
benefits.  Targeting these funds toward lower income groups is likely to enable the 
maximum level of redistribution at the lowest efficiency cost.    
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Highest Q2 Q3 Q4 Lowest  
 
Source:  Author’s tabulations of the Canadian Community Health Survey, 2000 
combined with 1996 life table data from Statistics Canada.
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Source:  Author’s tabulations of the Canadian Community Health Survey, 2000 
combined with 1996 life table data from Statistics Canada.
























Change in Tax Change in Health  
 
Source:  Health data from SourceOECD, downloaded October 2006.  Tax share data from 
OECD Annual revenue statistics at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/23/35471773.pdf, 
Table 2.
31   Source:  Health data from SourceOECD, downloaded October 2006.  Tax share data from 
OECD Annual revenue statistics at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/23/35471773.pdf, 
Table 2.
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Table 1:  Relationship between Spending Composition and Spending Growth 
 1975 1980 1985 1990   1995 2000 
Total  Expenditures        
 Gen  Rev  +  +  0  0  -  0 
 Soc  Ins  +  +  0  0  -  0 
 OOP  NA  +  0  0  -  0 
  (N)  (6) (11) (8) (11)  (16)  (20) 
Total Expenditures, No 
US 
      
 Gen  Rev  0  +  0  0  -  0 
  Soc  Ins  0 + 0 0 0 0 
 OOP  NA  NA  0  0  -  0 
  (N)  (5) (7) (7) (9)  (15)  (19) 
Public  Expenditures        
 Gen  Rev    +  0  0  -  0 
 Soc  Ins    +  -  -  -  - 
 OOP    +  -  -  -  - 
 (N)    (6)  (8)  (10)  (16)  (20) 
Public Expenditures, 
No US 
      
  Gen  Rev      0 0 0 0 
  Soc  Ins      0 0 0 0 
 OOP      0  0  -  0 
 (N)      (7)  (9)  (15)  (19) 
 
Data from SourceOECD, 2006 download.  Results are from regressions of spending in column heading year regressed on expenditures 
(total or public, respectively) 5 years earlier, and on the composition of spending 5 years earlier.  + indicates positive correlation, 0 
indicates no significant correlation at 10% confidence level, - indicates negative correlation. 
 
Table 2:  Lifetime Spending by Quintile and Redistributive Effect of Health Care Spending 
    At age 12  At Age 65 
   No  LE 0%  5%
Redistributive 
Effect at 5%  No LE  0%  5%
Redistributive 
Effect at 5% 
MALE              
  Highest  84953 66449 42332 0.13 52810 35521 19185 0.18
  Q2  95603 74698 48218 0.15 57653 38430 20927 0.20 
  Q3  129646 99472 64762 0.21 70187 43042 23200 0.22
 Q4  159807  129991  86414 0.28 68912 44595 24542 0.23
 Lowest  138298  105591  72194 0.23 61943 34521 18959 0.18
                
Low:High  1.63 1.59 1.71   1.17 0.97  0.99  
Low:Mid  1.07 1.06 1.11   0.88 0.80  0.82  
Mid:High  1.53 1.50 1.53   1.33 1.21  1.21  
FEMALE               
 Highest  127961  108881  69488 0.17 78174 60134 32276 0.27
  Q2  104700 92895 63603 0.16 45956 35450 19132 0.16
 Q3  124467  110567  75552 0.18 52484 40296 21766 0.18
 Q4  155599  139694  96697 0.24 57302 44085 23977 0.2
  Lowest  170540 151924 104844 0.26 53090 39145 21331 0.18
               
Low:High  1.33 1.40 1.51   0.68 0.65  0.66  
Low:Mid  1.37 1.37 1.39   1.01 0.97  0.98  
Mid:High  0.97 1.02 1.09   0.67 0.67  0.67  
 
Source:  Author’s tabulations of the Canadian Community Health Survey, 2000 
combined with 1996 life table data from Statistics Canada and SourceOECD October 
2006.  Spending computed as general practitioner visits @$75, specialist visits @$375, 
hospital days @$1000.  Redistributive effect describes share received by group from $1 
of health care spending, by gender. 
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